CASE STUDIES | Hansen v. United States
(August 2003 Case Study)
Background
In 1991, the financially troubled Hanlin Group, Inc. was forced into Chapter
11 bankruptcy. The following year, the founder and president Christian Hansen
convinced his son Randall, who lived with his family in New Jersey to temporarily
serve as Executive Vice President of LCP Chemicals, a division of Hamlin,
because the post had become vacant. Randall Hansen’s mission was to
develop the business and financial plans necessary to turn around the financial
condition of the chemicals business.
One
of LPC’s assets, its Brunswick, Georgia facility, which produced
a variety of commercial chemicals, had already experienced several environmental
problems when Randall Hansen was hired. The facility was equipped with
a wastewater treatment system and was authorized to discharge wastewater
to a nearby creek after they had treated it. Because the treatment system
could not always keep up with the facility’s production of wastewater,
LPC’s discharge permit authorized the facility to temporarily hold
wastewater on the floors of two large “cellrooms” until it
could be treated.
With
Hanlin in bankruptcy, there was almost no money available for maintenance
and repair on the facility’s wastewater treatment system, which,
consequently, began to break down frequently. Occasionally, when the treatment
system was down, the accumulated wastewater in the cellrooms reached excessive
levels and the facility had to discharge some untreated water into the
environment. As this discharge was in violation of their Clean Water Act
(CWA) permit, LPC reported such unpermitted discharges to the Georgia Environmental
Protection Division.
When
Randall Hansen heard of the unpermitted discharges from the plant manager,
he attempted to find the money for the necessary repairs by selling excess
equipment and reducing payroll. When that proved insufficient, he requested
the Hanlin Board of Directors, the bankruptcy creditor’s committee,
and the courts for money to address the wastewater problem, but was denied.
He even made attempts to sell the plant to a company with enough resources
to correct the problems. But those efforts also failed and the plant closed
in February 1994.
Litigation
Over four years later, Randall Hansen was indicted along with his father
and two other plant managers and charged with: (1) knowingly discharging
pollutants in violation of the Clean Water Act permit; (2) knowingly storing,
treating, or disposing of hazardous waste without a Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit; (3) through the RCRA violations, knowingly
endangering employees at the plant, such that they were placed in imminent
danger of death or substantial harm; and (4) conspiring with other officers
of Hanlin to violate these environmental laws.
Outcome
Several aspects of the Hansen case are especially troubling: By the time
he was charged, Randall Hansen had left the company, thus he was a former
officer. Moreover, some of the acts involved in the criminal charges were
acts that occurred after he left the company.
But
more significantly, whether occurring before or after Hansen’s tenure,
the acts were substantially ones over which he exercised no meaningful
control – if the concept of responsibility is to mean anything, it
must mean that an officer not only has “legal” authority to
exercise control of certain corporate activities, but that he also have
real, “practical” authority. In the absence of funds and authorization
from the bankruptcy committee Hansen, in effect, lacked practical control
over LPC’s operations. Nonetheless, the federal court said that he
could be held criminally liable for the wastewater discharges. Why? Because,
in the court’s view there is no requirement “that the officer
in fact exercise such authority or that the corporation expressly vest
a duty in the officer to oversee the activity.” In other words, practical
considerations are irrelevant – all that is necessary is proof of
an individual’s “status” as a manager.
Hansen
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 46 months. When the courts developed
the doctrine of a “responsible corporate officer” in Dotterweich and Park the
crimes were misdemeanors and the punishments trivial – Park paid
a $50 fine, much like a parking ticket. Now however, the doctrine has expanded
such that it will actually have the perverse effect of undermining regulatory
protection.
By
setting the threshold for criminal conduct so low, the law will chill or
discourage educated and capable people from serving in responsible corporate
positions. As Judge Kleinfeld said in United States v. Weitzenhoff,,
35 F.3d 1275, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc): “If we are fortunate, sewer plant workers
. . . will continue to perform their vitally important work despite our
decision. If they knew they risk three years in prison, some might decide
that their pay . . . is not enough to risk prison for doing their jobs.” The
same dynamic is, sadly, true in any regulated industry.